How Can Telecoms Prove Security Instead of Paperwork?

How Can Telecoms Prove Security Instead of Paperwork?

Vladislav Zaimov stands at the vital intersection of legacy network reliability and the cutting edge of 5G security. With a career spent navigating the labyrinthine architectures of global carriers, he has witnessed firsthand how a perfectly designed network on paper can crumble under the weight of a single misconfigured software update. In an era where connectivity is as vital as oxygen, Zaimov has become a leading voice for a fundamental shift in the industry: moving away from passive, check-the-box compliance and toward a model of active, continuous validation. His expertise lies in identifying the hidden fractures within vulnerable networks and helping operators build defenses that are as dynamic as the threats they face.

The following discussion explores the critical gap between theoretical security standards and the messy reality of physical network deployment. Zaimov breaks down the limitations of traditional annual audits in a world of constant software iterations and explains why modern infrastructure often remains haunted by legacy vulnerabilities like SS7. We dive into the practical application of Breach and Attack Simulation and look at how the latest initiatives are integrating artificial intelligence to predict, mitigate, and verify network threats in real time.

Architectural standards like 3GPP provide a meticulous blueprint for mobile security, yet assessments often find that reality doesn’t match the design. Why does this gap between theory and implementation persist in modern 5G environments?

The hard truth is that recognizing a good security standard is miles away from actually implementing it correctly in a live, breathing environment. When you look at 5G Service-Based Architecture, or SBA, the 3GPP standards and GSMA guidance like FS.31 are incredibly detailed, but they aren’t magic shields that install themselves. In my experience, we frequently encounter implementations of the Network Repository Function, or NRF, where the discovery process is essentially an open book. You expect to see robust authentication layers, but instead, our assessment teams find they can retrieve sensitive network function information without providing a single credential. It is a sobering moment for an operator to see their theoretical “fortress” bypassed because a configuration change during a routine deployment left the door wide open. This happens because networks are no longer static; they are software-defined, and software is prone to human error and oversight during every single update.

Many engineers working on newly deployed 4G and 5G networks seem to believe that legacy threats are a thing of the past. Based on your recent assessments, why is it a mistake to overlook older protocols like SS7?

There is a dangerous sense of complacency that comes with “new” technology, a feeling that because we’ve moved to 5G, the ghosts of the past have been exorcised. I remember a recent webinar where we discussed a brand-new 4G/5G network deployment where the site engineers were genuinely skeptical about the need for SS7 testing, assuming it was irrelevant to their shiny new infrastructure. It took us exactly three days to identify multiple critical vulnerabilities through their roaming interconnections with older, legacy networks. You have to remember that a network is only as strong as its weakest link, and as long as your modern core has to talk to older systems for roaming, you are inheriting decades of legacy exposure. It feels like a gut-punch to an engineering team when they realize that an attacker can use a protocol from the 1980s to compromise a subscriber on a 2026 network, but that is the reality of our interconnected global ecosystem.

If a telecom operator passes a rigorous security audit today, why isn’t that enough to ensure they stay protected for the rest of the year?

An audit is a high-resolution photograph of a moving train; it tells you exactly where the train was at 10:00 AM, but it says nothing about where it will be at midnight. In the time it takes to print an audit report, a technician might push a new network function, adjust a firewall policy, or roll out a software upgrade that inadvertently creates a massive security hole. We’ve seen cases where a single SBA configuration change completely neutralized a security control that had passed an inspection just weeks prior. Relying on an annual penetration test is essentially gambling that no mistakes will be made for 364 days, which is simply not realistic in a modern CI/CD telecom environment. Operators need to move away from the “paperwork” mindset and realize that security is a continuous state of being, not a destination you reach once a year.

Breach and Attack Simulation (BAS) is often mentioned as a solution to this constant change. How does this technology change the day-to-day operations for a security team?

The beauty of Breach and Attack Simulation is that it turns security from a rare, stressful event into a manageable, repeatable part of daily operations. Instead of waiting for a yearly assessment, BAS allows an operator to run realistic attack scenarios—like validating 5G SBA authorization or testing roaming policies—whenever a change occurs. It’s like having a digital adversary constantly poking at your defenses to make sure the walls are still solid. For example, after a firewall rule is updated, BAS can immediately verify that the protection is still working as intended, providing concrete evidence rather than just a “hope” that the config was right. It doesn’t replace the deep dive of a human penetration tester, but it ensures that the basic, critical controls are never left unverified for more than a few hours.

The Telco AEGIS project recently demonstrated a more automated approach to threat detection and remediation. Can you walk us through how that system handles a real-world scenario like subscriber tracking?

Telco AEGIS is a fascinating glimpse into how we are streamlining the workflow from detection to actual proof of remediation. In a subscriber-location tracking scenario, the process starts when an Intrusion Detection System flags suspicious traffic patterns that suggest someone is trying to pinpoint a user’s physical location. The system doesn’t just send an alert to a dashboard to sit there; it uses AI-assisted analysis to determine if existing firewall rules can block the threat. If the protection is found to be insufficient, the system proposes a new security policy and then—this is the crucial part—uses BAS to simulate the attack against that new rule before it ever touches the production network. Once the rule is deployed, the attack is replayed one last time to provide hard evidence that the tracker is now blocked, closing the loop with a level of certainty we’ve never had before.

While automation is powerful, there is often a fear of “roaming” autonomous systems making mistakes in production. What role does human oversight play in this new automated landscape?

We are not at a point where we can just hand the keys of a national telecommunications network over to an autonomous AI, and frankly, I don’t think we should be. In the Telco AEGIS demonstration, we made sure to include a mandatory step for human authorization before any security policy changes are actually applied to the production environment. This “human-in-the-loop” safeguard is essential because automated decisions can have unforeseen operational implications that a person needs to evaluate. Security automation should be viewed as a tool that empowers experts by doing the heavy lifting of analysis and verification, not as a replacement for the nuanced judgment of a veteran engineer. It’s about giving the human team the best possible data and the most verified solutions so they can make an informed decision in seconds rather than hours.

For an operator that is currently relying on traditional audits and lacks deep internal security expertise, what is the most practical way to start this journey toward continuous validation?

You don’t have to boil the ocean on day one; the best approach is to start small by identifying a single, high-risk attack path that keeps you up at night. Establish a repeatable test for that one specific vulnerability and make it a mandatory part of your change management process so it’s checked every time the network evolves. For teams that feel overwhelmed by the technical complexity, I often recommend starting with a period of managed testing where external experts handle the simulation while focusing on knowledge transfer to the internal staff. It’s better to have one automated, validated defense that you fully understand than a dozen expensive tools that no one knows how to use effectively. As the team’s confidence and skills grow, you can gradually layer in more complex automation, moving from simple validation toward the more sophisticated workflows we see in projects like AEGIS.

What is your forecast for the evolution of telecom security over the next few years as these automated systems become more standard?

I believe we are moving toward a future where “compliance” will be redefined from a static report to a real-time data stream of verified defenses. By 2028, the idea of waiting a year for a security assessment will seem as antiquated as using a dial-up modem, as operators will be expected to provide continuous proof of their security posture to regulators and customers alike. We will see a much tighter integration between the network’s operational core and its security layer, where the network itself becomes self-aware enough to detect a gap and suggest a verified fix in minutes. Ultimately, this shift will make telecom security measurable and manageable in a way that it has never been before, turning it from a hidden risk into a transparent, quantifiable strength of the infrastructure.

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