With a deep background in enterprise telecommunications and the risk management of vulnerable networks, Vladislav Zaimov offers a sharp analysis of Germany’s precarious position in the global 5G and 6G landscape. His insights cut through the political rhetoric to reveal the complex interplay of technology, economics, and national security. This discussion explores Germany’s delicate dance of appearing to ban Chinese vendors while protecting its vast economic interests, the starkly different estimates of what a network overhaul would truly cost, and the often-misunderstood technical risks lurking within the mobile network’s radio access components. We delve into the on-the-ground realities of integrating new suppliers into a mature network and consider how a future ban on 6G technology could render today’s multibillion-euro 5G investments obsolete.
Germany appears to be executing a long-term strategic pivot, with Chancellor Merz announcing a 6G ban on Chinese firms that won’t take effect for years. How do you interpret this approach, especially when balanced against the immediate reality of €90 billion in annual exports to China?
It’s a masterclass in political maneuvering, what some might call a “show ban.” Germany is trying to navigate an incredibly narrow path. On one side, you have immense pressure from the EU and other Western allies to de-risk critical infrastructure. On the other, you have the powerful German export economy, for which China is an indispensable partner. Announcing a ban on 6G, a technology that is still years from commercial deployment, is a way to signal alignment with Western security concerns without causing immediate economic disruption. It allows operators to keep their existing 5G Huawei gear running for years, avoiding a costly, immediate rip-and-replace, while placating critics by drawing a line in the sand for the next generation. It’s a calculated delay, a way of saying, “We hear you, we will act, but on a timeline that doesn’t detonate our economy.”
There’s a massive gap in the cost estimates for removing Huawei. Deutsche Telekom’s CEO talks about “billions,” but a Barclays report suggests a much more manageable €1 billion for his company. From your experience, what are the actual financial and logistical complexities of a swap-out that could explain such a discrepancy?
Both figures can be true, depending on the scenario you envision. When a CEO like Timotheus Höttges throws out a number like “billions,” he’s likely painting a picture of a forced, rapid, and complete overhaul. This would involve not just the cost of new equipment from vendors like Nokia or Ericsson but also emergency labor costs, network downtime, project management overhead, and the financial penalties of breaking long-term service contracts. It’s the “do it all now” price tag, which is always inflated. The Barclays estimate of €1 billion for Deutsche Telekom, or €2.5 billion for all of Germany, is based on a much more pragmatic, gradual approach. It assumes the replacement happens over the “natural upgrade lifecycle.” Operators are constantly investing in their networks; Deutsche Telekom spends about €300 million on its RAN each year. This view suggests that instead of buying the next Huawei upgrade, you simply allocate that planned capital expenditure to a new vendor. It’s less of a sudden shock and more of a strategic redirection of funds over several years.
Timotheus Höttges has argued that an antenna “doesn’t pose any kind of security risk.” However, regulators now seem to disagree, classifying the entire 5G basestation as critical. Could you unpack the specific security vulnerabilities in the Radio Access Network that his statement might be overlooking?
That statement is a significant oversimplification, and it’s one that regulators are now actively correcting. An antenna is just a passive piece of metal that transmits and receives signals. The real intelligence, the real risk, lies in the baseband unit and the associated software—what is technically called the gNodeB, or the 5G basestation. This is where the signal is processed, encrypted, and routed. It’s a sophisticated computing device running complex software. That software is the potential attack surface. A malicious actor could theoretically embed backdoors or boobytraps in the signal-processing software to intercept data, disrupt service, or launch attacks on the core network. The German regulator, the Bundesnetzagentur, has recognized this, which is why in their recent consultation they’ve explicitly stated that “all functions of gNodeB are classified as critical functions.” They’ve moved past the simplistic view of the RAN being “non-critical” and now see it as an integral part of the security chain.
Despite publicly defending its use of Huawei, Deutsche Telekom is actively replacing it with Nokia at 3,000 sites. What are the key operational metrics and step-by-step challenges an operator faces when trying to integrate a new vendor into a network where the incumbent, Huawei, has a 60% footprint?
This is a massive undertaking that goes far beyond just swapping hardware. First, you have the challenge of interoperability. A mobile network is a finely tuned ecosystem, and you need to ensure the new Nokia equipment can communicate seamlessly with the existing Huawei gear and the multi-vendor core network. This requires months of rigorous testing in labs and then in small-scale field trials before a wider rollout. Second, there’s the physical logistics of accessing 3,000 different sites, which could be on rooftops in dense cities or on remote towers. Each site visit requires skilled technicians, equipment transport, and potential service windows where the site is offline. Third, you have to manage two separate network management systems, which adds complexity for your network operations center. Your engineers have to be trained on the new Nokia systems while still maintaining the vast Huawei footprint. It’s like asking a team of mechanics who have only ever worked on one car brand to suddenly start servicing another, all while keeping the entire fleet on the road. It’s a slow, methodical, and expensive process.
What is your forecast for the future of Chinese vendors in the German and broader European telecom market?
My forecast is a slow, managed, and inevitable decline of their dominance in European network infrastructure. The window of opportunity for them has largely closed. Huawei survived the initial 5G turbulence through its technical excellence and deep relationships with operators, but the geopolitical conditions are getting progressively worse. The German 6G ban is the writing on the wall. Because 6G is seen as an “evolution” of 5G, likely deployed via software on 5G hardware, operators cannot afford to invest in a 5G platform today that will become a strategic dead end tomorrow. We’re already seeing the diversification in practice—Deutsche Telekom bringing in Nokia, Vodafone using Samsung. While Huawei’s 60% footprint in Germany won’t disappear overnight, it will be steadily eroded with every network upgrade cycle. It will be a phase-out measured in years, not months, but the strategic direction is now unmistakably set against them.
